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       This Article examines the impact of increased corporate mobility on corporate lawmaking in the European Union 
(EU). More specifically, what is the answer to a simple question: has the increased mobility which arose from the imple-
mentation of the Societas Europaea (SE) and the path-breaking decisions of the European Court of Justice spread regula-
tory competition and caused the emergence of a Delaware-like member state in Europe? Two types of corporate mobility 
are distinguished: (1) the incorporation mobility of start-up firms, and (2) the reincorporation mobility of established 
firms. As to incorporation mobility, the Centros triad of cases makes it possible for start-up firms to incorporate in a 
foreign jurisdiction and many entrepreneurs have taken advantage of this new freedom. However, recent data from Ger-
many and the Netherlands indicate declining numbers of such foreign incorporations over time. Moreover, Centros-based 
incorporation mobility is a rather insignificant phenomenon, economically speaking, since the only incentive is minimi-
zed cost of incorporation. National lawmakers have responded by amending their statutes to lower these costs. But, be-
cause out of pocket cost minimization at the organization stage is only of secondary importance in “choice-of-business-
form” decisions, no competitive pressures arise *348 that would engage national legislatures in far-reaching reform of 
corporate governance more generally. As to reincorporation mobility, which concerns the migration of the statutory seat 
of a firm incorporated in one member state to another, the SE has opened the door, but not wide enough to serve as a 
catalyst for company law arbitrage. Reincorporation mobility is still far from available in the EU. As a result, competitive 




       It is increasingly argued that the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has prompted competitive corporate lawmaking in 
Europe. [FN1] The string of cases starting with Centros provides two important pre-conditions for regulatory competiti-
on: mutual recognition and minimum standards. At present, start-up firms of all sizes can select a statutory seat anywhere 
in the European market without being hampered by severe constraints built into their home states' corporate law. Alt-
hough the ECJ has not explicitly pronounced the incorporation doctrine, domestic courts now normally apply the law of 
the state of incorporation to corporate affairs (the rapport among directors, officers, and shareholders). This is true even if 
the corporation in question transacts no other business in that state. Under the ECJ case law, a member state in which a 
corporation has its seat can only impose its own stricter legal standards if it can justify them as essential requirements to 
protect the general interest. These standards must be applied reasonably and on a non-discriminatory basis. [FN2] Start-
up firms have taken advantage of this new freedom, choosing to incorporate in member states offering more favorable 
conditions, in particular, the absence of minimum capital requirements. The United Kingdom has emerged as the situs of 
choice. 
 
       The UK, which recently overhauled its company law, could be well placed to establish itself as the leading state for 
European business*349 formations, like Delaware in the United States. The question arises whether and to what degree 
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these developments might encourage lawmakers, in the United Kingdom or other member states, to engage in competiti-
ve lawmaking by designing policies that provide a more attractive regulatory environment in the corporate law arena. 
 
       Unfortunately, the Delaware model offers little immediate encouragement. The U.S. market for corporate charters 
was jump-started more than a century ago by a state seeking a yield of premium franchise taxes and chartering fees by 
luring large existing corporations to a regulatory comfort zone that extended from antitrust to corporate governance. 
[FN3] Delaware continues to operate within this incentive framework, albeit only from the corporate governance angle. 
As yet, such incentives cannot be replicated in Europe. The rulings in Centros, Überseeing, and Inspire Art do not expli-
citly offer large existing firms the possibility of free choice to reincorporate and migrate across borders. [FN4] And even 
if they did, charter fees and franchise taxes are not available to entice European member states to modernize and optimize 
their corporate law regimes. 
 
       If not franchise taxes and chartering fees, what else might motivate European national lawmakers to create more 
responsive corporate legal regimes, and how might corporate mobility figure in such an environment? Delaware lawma-
kers now have a secondary incentive thanks to the demands and the economic benefits emanating from a large professio-
nal services sector located in the state.   [FN5] There follows a second, weaker European analogy: member state lawma-
kers can seek to provide legal rules and institutions that are attractive to both domestic and foreign firms if doing so bene-
fits the professional services industry. [FN6] For this reason, it has been argued that the introduction of the Societas Eu-
ropaea (European Company, SE) Statute in 2001 and its subsequent implementation in October 2004 could provide a 
strong impetus for company law shopping in Europe. [FN7] The SE for the first time allowed a European corporation to 
reincorporate without first liquidating itself and forming a completely new entity. Moreover, the internal governance 
structure of an *350 SE continues to be governed largely by national legislation. Consequently the SE Statute could sti-
mulate regulatory arbitrage across the EU. More specifically, a firm can, in theory, convert into an SE to avail itself of a 
more beneficial corporate law regime, so long as it is willing to move its seat to that more beneficial state. It follows, 
theoretically, that a jurisdiction might have incentives to provide such benefits. A sophisticated corporate legal regime, 
characterized by responsiveness to the demands of management and capital, could bestow prestige onto the jurisdiction's 
lawmakers and bring revenues to its legal intermediaries. 
 
       This scenario gains additional credibility with the recent adoption of the Directive on Cross-Border Mergers and the 
ECJ's Sevic case. [FN8] The Directive allows corporations to merge and restructure across borders within the EU, and 
could enable firms to overcome some obstacles to free corporate mobility stemming from differences in national corpora-
te laws, thereby stimulating competitive lawmaking. Sevic suggests that medium-sized and large firms have a right to 
relocate their seat based on the legal rules they prefer. As a practical matter, this parallels the mobility option offered by 
the SE. 
 
       The door to mobility has opened only in theory, however. Absent accurate data on cross-border mergers, it is too 
early to conclude whether the Directive and the Sevic case will actually lead to increased reincorporation and eventually 
more regulatory competition in Europe. Barriers remain, quite apart from the lack of affirmative national lawmaking. 
First, tax barriers continue to limit European firms' mobility and hence deter lawmakers from jumping on the competition 
bandwagon. For instance, if a firm seeks to move its administrative seat to another member state while remaining incor-
porated in its own member state for the purpose of tax avoidance, the member state of origin may freely impose conditi-
ons. [FN9] Second, the lack of a common history, culture, and language among the member states further reduces the 
possibility of U.S.-style corporate lawmaking in Europe. [FN10] Third, national lawmakers resist encroachments on their 
own judicial discretion. National regimes created barriers to corporate mobility to preserve their lawmakers' autonomy 
long ago *351 and its continued preservation reinforces the barriers, despite the founding of the EU. One could argue that 
as long as the member states retain enough discretion to deter the emigration of existing firms, the real seat doctrine has 
only been diminished, not eradicated. If eradication is indeed the ECJ's ultimate goal, the job has not yet been completed. 
 
       Still, there have been recent signs of responsiveness among European lawmakers as in the promulgation of a limited 
liability partnership in the UK and the flexible société par actions simplifiée (SAS) in France. [FN11] These, plus the 
beginning migration to the United Kingdom and the reincorporation of large firms under the SE statute, raise the question 
whether Europe approaches (or has indeed reached) a tipping point at which the responsiveness to corporate mobility 
displaces the desire to preserve national control. 
 
       This Article reviews the recent evolution of corporate mobility and corporate law in Europe. Part I explains and 
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assesses the process by which European corporate law has evolved, tracing its development back to the founding of the 
EU in 1957. It shows that the member states have consistently attempted to prevent any intervention into their national 
corporate law legislation. Upon the inception of the EU, most member states followed the real seat doctrine, blocking 
corporate mobility and limiting choice of situs. The creation of the EU could have facilitated movement away from the 
real seat doctrine, [FN12] but it did not. Founding member states, such as France and West Germany, feared the conse-
quences of a so-called “race-to-the-bottom” in corporate law. This led to the introduction of top-down harmonization of 
national corporate law regimes; the member states agreed, in exchange for political benefits or rents, to desist from op-
portunism after attaining Community membership. This cooperative agreement included an additional element: member 
states would only agree to the harmonization of national corporate laws if it could be achieved without alteration of their 
own laws' core components. [FN13] The member states' subsequent reluctance to adopt EU level corporate law confir-
med and reinforced the desire for national legislative autonomy. 
 
       Part II turns to recent disruptions of the EU's corporate lawmaking pattern. Even as the EU has continued to pursue 
its *352 harmonization strategy, policymakers within the Commission have set out to design a more independent agenda 
on the basis of Article 308 (formerly 235) of the EC Treaty. [FN14] EU level business models, such as the SE, have been 
introduced to stimulate cross-border mobility while at the same time covering the creation and conversion of particular 
undertakings. Part II analyzes the impact of the introduction of the SE and assesses whether its implementation has led to 
an increase in firm mobility that might induce member states to embark on a more innovative and ambitious lawmaking 
path. 
 
       Part III turns to ECJ case law and to the mobility of start-up firms. It will show a significant pent-up demand for 
incorporate start-up companies in a low-cost jurisdiction. Marco Becht, Colin Mayer, and Hannes Wagner investigated 
new company formations in the United Kingdom between 1997 and 2006 and showed an increase in the number of “fo-
reign” private limited companies from 4,400 per year pre-Centros to 28,000 post-Centros. [FN15] They also show that 
48,000 of the almost 120,000 “foreign” private limited companies formed in the United Kingdom post-Centros came 
from Germany alone. [FN16] This increased mobility has created competitive pressures. Germany, the Netherlands and, 
to a lesser extent, France have been driven to institute reforms to their corporate law and tax regimes not only to stem the 
flow of firms migrating to the United Kingdom, but also to establish a reputation as competitive jurisdictions. [FN17] 
Part III offers a detailed analysis of the UK incorporation pattern, an analysis that implies a disappointing picture of res-
ponsive lawmaking incentives. Based on data from Germany and the Netherlands, the volume of incorporation mobility 
resulting from the ECJ case law is presently declining. Declining or not, the volume is rather trivial in any event, both as 
an economic proposition and as a lawmaking motivation. So far, the ECJ decisions have only triggered minor initiatives, 
influencing some jurisdictions--like Germany and the Netherlands-- to eliminate or reduce minimum capital requirements 
for private companies and to focus on low-cost formation. There has been little or no sign of broader legislative innovati-
on or case law reform. 
 
        *353 Part IV concludes that even as the new mobility has contributed to discreet modifications of company law in 
some member states, what little mobility exists is objectively insufficient to promote demands for new institutions and to 
alter lawmakers' incentives and behavior. It is too early to predict the emergence of a European Delaware. 
 
I. EU Company Law Directives: The “Non-Competition” Strategy 
 
       Under the historic pattern of EU level corporate lawmaking, national legislatures have had a virtual monopoly, sup-
ported by the twin pillars of the real seat doctrine in conflict of laws and national tax regimes. The real seat doctrine 
barred essential legal recognition of firms that attempted to change their state of incorporation while maintaining their 
seat. This does not mean that all member states followed the real seat doctrine. Some endorsed the incorporation doctrine 
and recognized foreign incorporations of domestic businesses. But even in the latter jurisdictions, national regulators 
restrained local entrepreneurs from incorporating elsewhere by restricting their reentry: reentering firms, termed “pseudo 
foreign corporations,” were required to apply the core rules of the home member state. Mobility could be achieved only 
by physical relocation of the firm's administrative headquarters--the “seat.” Barriers in the form of exit taxes remained in 
place. The trio of real seat doctrine, restrictions on pseudo foreign corporations, and exit taxes constituted a stable, long-
term lawmaking equilibrium; a cooperative strategy prevailed and no incentives existed for member states to engage in 
competitive corporate lawmaking activity. 
 
       EU corporate lawmaking initiatives have not disrupted this balance. From the inception of the harmonization pro-
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gram in 1957 through the modernization period of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts, EU corporate law 
was never intended to stimulate a right of establishment of pseudo-foreign companies; it has not lowered barriers to cor-
porate mobility. Indeed, under its present non-intervention approach, EU lawmaking deters member states both from 
dismantling costly legal barriers to reincorporation and from developing responsive measures aimed at encouraging cor-
porate mobility. Thus the EU's harmonization program reinforced the non-competition equilibrium among the member 
states. 
 
A. The First Generation of Company Law Directives 
 
       Prior to the establishment of the EU, Europe amounted to a group of island jurisdictions, in which domestic lawma-
kers, each with different constituencies and political concerns, pursued their own policy agendas. Each jurisdictional 
island possessed an elite group of *354 legislators, judges, regulatory agencies, professionals, and legal academics res-
ponsible for interpreting, preserving, and developing the law. They did so within conservative frameworks, mostly undis-
turbed by, and unresponsive to, possible changes in the legal systems of surrounding islands. As jurisdictional islands, the 
states remained privileged to close their borders in response to exterior competitive threats. For example, in the nineteen-
th century, Belgium tried to play a non-cooperative corporate law game vis-à-vis France, encouraging French executives 
to change their jurisdictions of incorporation. France and other high cost jurisdictions responded to this opportunistic 
initiative by introducing the real seat doctrine, which provides that the laws of the host state apply if the actual center of 
the corporation's activities is located there. This doctrine in effect closed the borders to corporate entry and exit. 
 
       It becomes more difficult to keep the border closed when an island jurisdiction becomes part of a common market in 
which national trade barriers gradually disappear. Pressure for corporate mobility is more likely to surface in such an 
environment. Actions by a federal lawmaking body can help stimulate cross-border activities and the Treaty of Rome 
(1957) establishing the European Common Market, entailed just such possibilities. The Treaty was designed to encourage 
the creation of an integrated market by assuring the free movement of goods, services, people, and capital. It gave foreign 
corporations the right to establish branches in another member state (host state) without being subject to more restrictive 
corporate law provisions there. At that time, the real seat theory remained dominant. 
 
       But in 1957 many feared that the doctrine was losing ground. The Netherlands had recently abandoned it. Further-
more, it appeared that the Treaty could usher in a new era of corporate mobility. Article 293 (formerly 220) of the Treaty 
invited member states to enter into negotiations regarding the 1968 Brussels Convention on Mutual Recognition of Com-
panies and Legal Entities, which would have abandoned the real seat doctrine in favor of the incorporation doctrine. 
Reaction was split. Some founding member states feared an outbreak of the so-called “race-to-the-bottom.” They had 
learned important lessons about the effects of charter competition from the U.S. experience. [FN18] Competition was 
seen to entail substantial losses for domestic interest groups. France in particular was concerned that the Netherlands, 
which had a more flexible corporation law code, *355 would not cooperate in corporate tax matters, [FN19] and would 
therefore be able to attract a large number of pseudo-foreign companies. 
 
       Charter competition's opponents responded by using the lawmaking process, triggered by the Treaty and aimed at the 
elimination of disparities among the laws of EU member governments, to reduce potential benefits of competition. Fran-
ce and West Germany promoted top-down harmonization of national corporate laws as an EU agenda item. Existing 
members and new entrants went along and the EU's mandatory corporate law Directives were the result. They sought to 
ensure compliance with a minimum level of regulation. With a common set of legal rules shared by each jurisdiction, no 
member state would have the power needed to create law that would attract incorporations and hence no incentives to 
compete would exist. 
 
       This first generation of corporate law Directives restated the existing content of the member states' national laws. 
They created mandatory rules, such as minimum capital requirements and disclosure rules, but the Directives made no 
attempt to expand the mutual recognition of firms. Even as EU lawmakers justified the harmonization Directives as mea-
sures to protect creditors and shareholders, their lawmaking scheme maintained special interest provisions that were 
already in place in the respective member states prior to the elimination of trade barriers. [FN20] Incumbent manage-
ment, for example, had every reason to support provisions that would limit dividend payments and share repurchases in 
order to have more leeway to reinvest the firm's profits. 
 
       To sum up, the early member states respected each other's corporate law. They agreed to desist from non-cooperative 
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corporate lawmaking in exchange for membership in the Community. They negotiated and enforced a political agreement 
that protected their national stock markets and domestic labor agreements. Still small in number, they were concerned 
with political stability as well as economic integration. They valued political payoffs yielded by stable corporation laws 
more highly than the chance for enhanced economic profit held out by corporate mobility and competitive experimentati-
on. 
 
*356 B. Harmonization and the Adoption of the Directive on Cross-Border Mergers 
 
       The second wave of corporate law Directives was arguably more flexible, granting states options with respect to 
compliance. These options ensured that the Directives did not interfere with core elements of given member states' natio-
nal laws, reflecting the added diversity of legal regimes resulting from the admission of new member states, including the 
United Kingdom. But the style of legislative drafting remained unchanged, with rigidity and top down mandate remai-
ning the dominant mode. So even as the compliance option signaled a more cooperative approach to harmonization, the 
member states proved unable to agree on particular Directives. 
 
       The rigid approach eventually showed its limitations. Harmonization of core areas of corporate law, for example, the 
structure and responsibility of the board of directors or cross-border mergers, proved slow and ineffective.   [FN21] This 
did not come as a surprise: the member states valued the autonomy of their national legal regimes. They had fundamental 
disagreements regarding important issues, such as board composition and employee participation, and so proved reluctant 
to implement the harmonization rules. Without a politically acceptable consensus, regular vetoes of directive proposals 
under Article 100 of the EC Treaty (now Article 94) followed. 
 
       In 1985, the ECJ and the European Commission responded to calls for greater flexibility by adopting a new approach 
to harmonization, namely minimum harmonization and mutual recognition. [FN22] The following year, the Single Euro-
pean Act (SEA) attempted to resolve possible veto blockages at the Council level by providing for a consultation proce-
dure and qualified majority voting. A number of corporate law Directives were promulgated between 1968 and 1989, 
removing a wide range of discrepancies between the member states' rules with respect to the protection of shareholders. 
[FN23] 
 
       The EU reached another stage in the evolution of the harmonization with the development of the subsidiarity princi-
ple, embraced by *357 the member states in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty on the European Union. [FN24] Subsidiarity, 
embodied in Article 5, concerns areas that are not within the exclusive competence of the EU [FN25] and determines the 
allocation of competencies between the EU and the member states. [FN26] 
 
       The European Commission, building on the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, developed a new, more 
flexible type of Directive. The new approach moved away from the provision of minimum standards to a framework 
model. Even with the introduction of this new standard, however, success of harmonization corporate law has been limi-
ted. Deeply rooted conflicts persist between the member states over the direction and pace of implementation of corpora-
te law Directives, as exemplified by the significantly weakened Directive on Takeovers passed in 2003. 
 
       The Commission's current efforts to reform the regulatory framework for corporate law have been largely inspired 
by recommendations made by a High Level Group of experts commissioned by the EU. [FN27] These measures are 
designed to simplify existing rules and improve freedom of choice between alternative forms of organization. The pro-
gram looks toward reform at four levels. First, the Commission proposes to modernize corporate law by further harmoni-
zing corporate disclosure, board structure, and director liability requirements and by amending capital requirement rules. 
Second, it plans to adopt rules facilitating corporate restructuring and mobility. Third, it proposes the establishment of a 
permanent coordination structure, the European Corporate Governance Forum, to work alongside member state agencies 
to sanction unfit directors. Fourth, it proposes to strengthen the supervision of auditors and to adopt comprehensive rules 
on the conduct of audits. This initiative largely *358 retraces terrain covered by previous harmonization attempts; accor-
dingly, its prospects for success are dim. 
 
       What has borne fruit is the High Level Group's call for an urgent submission of a revised Directive on cross-border 
mergers resulted in Directive 2005/56/EC which entered into force on December 15, 2005. Negotiations over a directive 
to facilitate the merger of corporations that have their statutory and business seat in different member states had been 
ongoing for two decades. [FN28] Such transactions traverse national company law protectionism: since a cross-border 
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merger results in the ceasing of the acquired and absorbed companies, one member state's corporation law potentially 
loses its application to the enterprise and with it the protection of national shareholders, creditors, employees, and other 
stakeholders. The new Directive's provisions, which should have been implemented into national corporation laws by 
December 15, 2007, apply to mergers in which at least two corporations are governed by the laws of different member 
states. The adoption of these rules could be viewed as a significant disturbance of the EU's non-competitive corporate 
law equilibrium. 
 
       Still, the Directive on cross-border mergers does not give merging firms carte blanche to adopt a legal system that 
presents them with a preferred governance structure and board composition. The Directive is largely based on the provi-
sions of the SE Statute, and strict principles and arrangements relating to employee participation--as set out in the Coun-
cil Directive No 2001/86/EC of October 2001 with regard to the involvement of employees in the SE--apply under the 
Directive if the corporation law of the absorbing company does not provide for at least the same employment participati-
on regime as is applicable in one of the merging and thus disappearing companies. With respect to the involvement of 
employees, the Directive applies only if the merging companies have an average of more than five hundred employees in 
the six months preceding the publication of the draft terms of the merger. 
 
       As the Directive's provisions follow from those of the SE Statute, it might be useful to look to the SE for the genesis 
of the legislative movement favoring cross-border mobility. 
 
*359 II. The Societas Europaea: Challenging the “Non-Competition” Strategy? 
 
A. The SE: An Incomplete Lawmaking Product 
 
       First generation EU lawmakers were convinced that an SE Statute could create an economic environment in which 
firms could reach their full potential and, more crucially, promote cooperation among firms located in different regions of 
the EU. [FN29] In line with the first harmonization Directives, the Commission initially aimed to create a uniform and 
comprehensive legislative proposal to serve as a basis for a truly genuine European business model. This led to a first 
proposal in 1970. But, since its approach threatened the member states' lawmaking autonomy, this proposal predictably 
failed to obtain approval. It took until 1989 before the Commission published a new draft Statute. In order to expedite its 
adoption, it was decided to address the employee participation issue in a different Directive. A report--produced by a 
group of experts chaired by former Commission President Etienne Davignon--outlined a compromise solution regarding 
labor participation and opened the door for compromise legislation that resolved political difficulties, though only by 
referring extensively to the national corporation law of the member state where the SE would have its administrative seat. 
[FN30] The Council finally adopted the SE Statute in December 2000, and it entered into force in October 2004. 
 
       The SE Statute makes it possible for a firm to effect reincorporation from one member state to another by reorgani-
zing as an SE and transferring the administrative seat. Under the Statute, legal persons may form an SE through (1) mer-
ger of two or more existing companies that are governed by the laws of at least two different member states (cross-border 
merger), (2) formation of a holding company promoted by public or private limited companies, (3) formation of a jointly 
held subsidiary, or (4) conversion of an existing public limited company. [FN31] Some governance matters are directly 
governed by the SE Statute. Most matters, however, are determined by renvoi to the national company law of the mem-
ber state where the SE has its seat. The Statute explicitly allows firms to select a one-tier system of corporate governance 
in which the SE comprises a general meeting of shareholders and a board of directors. If the SE prefers to have a supervi-
sory board that monitors the board of directors, the Statute provides for the implementation of a two-tier system. 
 
        *360 Significantly, the Statute does open a door for a German Aktiengesellschaft (AG) to escape the strict German 
rules on labor codetermination, but not based on a unilateral management decision. A special negotiation procedure for 
worker participation must be followed upon the SE's creation. [FN32] The Directive distinguishes between information 
and consultation on the one hand and participation on the other. The employee representatives must be informed in all 
cases of material decisions and given the opportunity to influence the deliberation and decision-making process. In addi-
tion, if twenty-five percent of the originating firm's employees have a right to participate in management, the employees' 
representatives must consent to the planned composition of the supervisory board (two-tier) or board of management 
(one-tier). Thus, a German AG whose unions agree to give up all or part of their supervisory board representation can 
reorganize as an SE with whatever governance structure agreed to by the unions. No relocation of the administrative seat 
to another member state need occur. 
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       The Statute offers three advantages. To begin with, as the first European level legislation that allows for cross-border 
mergers, it makes it relatively easy to relocate the administrative seat into another member state. [FN33] Second, the 
Statute holds out cost advantages for a firm not seeking to change its seat but wishing to consolidate operations in multi-
ple member states. Even if it plans no change of seat, a firm can merge its various subsidiaries into the SE. The SE emer-
ges as a unitary entity organized in one member state with operating branches in other states across the EU. The advanta-
ge is that all companies in the group now follow a single body of corporate law. The recent conversion of Alliance AG 
into an SE suggests that firms do see cost advantages in operating under a single set of rules. Third, the Statute makes it 
possible for a parent to merge out a minority shareholder interest in a subsidiary without having to take the potentially 
costly step of making a tender offer for the minority shares. [FN34] 
 
       Despite its encouragement of corporate mobility and other advantages, many experts question whether the SE makes 
any sense in practice. Practitioners express skepticism about EU level legislative measures and point to the lack of statu-
tory guidance when it comes to incorporation and operation as an SE. They view this European business*361 form as 
compromise legislation that offers rigid and unattractive choices for the structuring of a firm's internal affairs. [FN35] 
Even though the Statute clears a path around obstacles in the cross-border reincorporation process, the path is much too 
narrow to lead to an uninhibited choice of situs of incorporation. For instance, start-up firms cannot establish an SE ex 
novo or ex nihilo. [FN36] What is more, the provisions set forth in the Directive on Involvement of Employees stipulate 
the level of employee involvement in the formation and operation of an SE and, as a result, decrease rather than increase 
the SE's attractiveness. [FN37] In particular, the need to enter into negotiations with employee representatives creates a 
bottleneck. Last, but not least, the absence of a specific tax regime, particularly with regard to cross-border seat transfers, 
is likely to be a significant impediment to the SE's use. 
 
       Still, as of mid-December 2008, more than 300 SEs had been incorporated. The resulting pattern of usage allows for 
some preliminary conclusions about the SE's role in stimulating corporate mobility. 
 
B. The SE: A Vehicle for Company Law Arbitrage? 
 
       Corporate law forum shopping has not been a salient motivation for the 310 SEs that were formed so far. Although 
numbers of new SEs have steadily increased quarter by quarter since its introduction in October 2004 (see Figure 1) 
overall numbers, whether quarterly or in aggregate, remain small. This suggests that the Commission's efforts to find an 
attractive alternative for firms seeking to pursue cross-border activities or migration strategies have borne little fruit. 
 
       But the numbers can also be read positively: the Commission's new business model is being used in increasing num-
bers even if it has not encouraged forum shopping. The average number of new SEs per quarter was only eight as of the 
end of 2007. In contrast, the fourth quarter of 2008 saw approximately fifty new entities emerge. Critics must accordingly 
acknowledge that there is demand for an EU-level business form designed to facilitate cross-border movement. More-
over, if we take into account the SE's time-consuming formation procedures and the legal advisors' unfamiliarity with it, 
[FN38] the small *362 but growing numbers come as no surprise. Indeed, in an environment in which differences in 
culture and legal traditions abound, the SE should be considered a success: it enables more cross-border mergers and 
activities, and also offers firms subject to different jurisdictions a cost-effective means of pursuing inter-jurisdictional 
strategies. 
 
       A more complete picture of the effect of the SE on corporate mobility emerges from a look at the main determinants 
of SE formations. Analyzing the available data yields some interesting, albeit unsurprising, conclusions. First, it appears 
that the benefits of establishing an SE outweigh its considerable formation costs mainly in jurisdictions with widespread 
employee participation rights. For instance, German BASF AG estimated a cost of 5,000,000 to convert to an SE. This 
amount includes the costs of compliance with the necessary legal and accounting requirements as well as registration and 
disclosure costs. [FN39] The fact that eighty-seven percent of the SEs are established, and have their administrative seat, 
in countries with strict regulations, particularly in the area of formation and employee participation (see Table 1), indica-
tes that there are important reasons other than cross-border benefits that make it cost-effective to accept the cumbersome 
formation requirements. There is evidence that firms interested in the SE model may also be attracted to the advantages 
of its flexible governance structure and its protection of shareholder participation rights. 
 
Figure 1: Total Number of SEs Registered (October 2004 to December 2008) [FN40] 
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TABULAR OR GRAPHIC MATERIAL SET FORTH AT THIS POINT IS NOT DISPLAYABLE  
 
*363 Table 1: Correlation Between Participation Rights and Number of Registered SEs 
 
       ountries with widespread participation rights at board level 
   
 
      Germany  
  
 
       85 SEsFN [FN41] registered 
   
 
      Czech Republic  
  
 
      111 SE registered 
   
 
      Hungary  
  
 
       2 SEs registered 
   
 
      Luxembourg  
  
 
       13 SEs registered 
   
 
      Netherlands  
  
 
       29 SEsFN [FN42] registered 
   
 
      Norway  
  
 
       6 SEs registered 
   
 
      Austria  
  
 
       12 SEs registered 
   
 
      Slovakia  
  
 
       5 SEs registered 
   
 
      Sweden  
  
 
       4 SEs registered 
   
 
      Denmark  
  
 
       2 SEs registered 
   
 
      Countries with limited participation rights at board level 
   
 
      Belgium  
  
 
       7 SEs registered 
   
 
      Cyprus  
  
 
       7 SE registered 
   
 
      Estonia  
  
       1 SE registered 
   
 57 AMJCL 347 Page 9
57 Am. J. Comp. L. 347 
  
© 2009 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
  
      France  
  
 
       8 SEs registered 
   
 
      Latvia  
  
 
       3 SEs registered 
   
 
      Ireland  
  
 
       1 SE registered 
   
 
      Spain  
  
 
       1 SE registered 
   
 
      Countries with no (or very limited) participation rights at board level 
   
 
      Liechtenstein  
  
 
       2 SE registered 
   
 
      United Kingdom  
  
 
       11 SEs registered 
   
 
       Source: Adapted from information available at http://ecdb.worker-participation.eu/. 
       While the SE allows firms to adopt voluntarily the corporation law of a more flexible and liberal jurisdiction by 
changing their administrative seat, firms tend not to do so for practical and psychological reasons. Of the “normal” SEs, 
i.e., those that actually have operations and employees, we see that more than sixty percent have been formed by the 
conversion of national corporations that had one or *364 more subsidiaries in other member states (see Figure 2). Instead 
of stimulating reincorporation mobility, then, the SE competes with national business models, such as the Aktiengesell-
schaft in Germany. 
 
Figure 2: SEs per Category 
 
TABULAR OR GRAPHIC MATERIAL SET FORTH AT THIS POINT IS NOT DISPLAYABLE 
        Source: adapted from information available at http://ecdb.worker-participation.eu/. [FN43] 
       The following business cases exemplify the advantages of the SE. 
 
       In August 2006, MAN B&W Diesel AG, a German world market leader of two- and four-stroke engines, [FN44] 
converted to an SE. Significantly, it was the first German company that successfully concluded an agreement with the 
employee representatives of different European business divisions. Even though Augsburg remained the administrative 
and statutory seat of MAN Diesel SE, the conversion offered the possibility to deviate from the rigid co-determination 
provisions that apply to the German AG by reducing the number of supervisory board members from twelve to ten as 
well as by giving its supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat) a more international composition (thereby reducing the influence of 
German workers). [FN45] The intended conversions by Fresenius AG, a German Healthcare company, and BASF AG 
indicate that this is the prime motivator for German companies. Both companies attempt to involve all European employ-
ees in *365 the appointment procedure of the members of the supervisory board. [FN46] 
 
       Other companies in strict regulation jurisdictions, such as Germany and Austria, go a step further and take the oppor-
tunity to choose a one-tier board structure. A recent example is Mensch und Maschine Software SE, a high-tech company 
that focuses on Computer Aided Design and Manufacturing (CAD/CAM) solutions. This German-based firm converted 
to an SE adopting the one-tier system because it is the preferable corporate governance structure for listed high-tech 
companies in which management holds a significant number of the outstanding shares. A single tier board makes prompt 
and flexible decision-making possible. This is viewed as a substantive benefit for firms that operate in a fast-growing and 
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ever-changing business environment and may explain why the majority of the “normal” SEs opted into the one-tier sys-
tem offered by the SE Statute. 
 
       Finally, twenty-seven percent of the set of SEs have been established as ready-made shelf, or “preformed” compa-
nies. These are organized by promoters as ready-made corporate entities for sale to entrepreneurs. They provide a conve-
nient option for a firm requiring an EU-level business form without first going through the complex, costly, and time-
consuming formation requirements. [FN47] 
 
       Part III, discussing post-Centros start-ups, will show that in this category too, “registration agents” play an important 
role in promoting new practices. For instance, the German Foratis AG, which according to its website is a market leader 
in shelf companies, [FN48] offers SEs for a purchase price of 132,000. With such an SE, buyers acquire an EU-level 
entity with a share capital of 120,000. Because many of the SEs that are offered off the shelf by this agent are structured 
as a one-tier board, it could indeed be concluded that corporate governance rather than mobility considerations are res-
ponsible for the appearance of a niche market for shelf SEs. [FN49] The fact that *366 Foratis AG focuses on the Ger-
man market reinforces the conclusion that the SE is generally viewed as an additional “national” business form that, 
besides its international allure, offers advantages mainly in the area of corporate governance. 
 
       Some tentative conclusions can be reached now about this EU-level initiative four years after its introduction. On 
balance, experience with the SE suggests wide acceptance that management uses the SE to streamline internal governan-
ce structures and to protect minority shareholders from exposure to opportunism by non-shareholder constituencies. At 
the same time, the legislation has not resulted in the hoped-for increase of reincorporation mobility. It appears that sub-
stantial legal cost and cultural barriers stave off the use of the SE for migration of administrative and statutory seats to 
other member states, even though it is tailored to suit larger companies and its use as such is becoming more widespread. 
Finally, it is foreseeable that companies located in the EU's new member states will value the European label of the SE 
more than companies in member states of longer standing. [FN50] Because firms in most Eastern European member 
states are perceived to lack credible enforcement mechanisms and high quality governance institutions, corporate lawyers 
in recent years have urged them to use the SE to facilitate entry into foreign markets. Because of its European status, the 
SE is viewed as a reliable contract party that offers effective protection to its investors and creditors. 
 
       To be sure, these are important developments, but not developments that significantly enhance mobility. European 
developments that do enhance mobility have occurred, but they apply only to smaller and private companies in the wake 
of Centros and its progeny. Part III will assess these developments as they have triggered competitive pressures that 
could stimulate innovative corporate lawmaking by national legislatures. 
 
III. ECJ Case Law: Challenging the “Non-Competition” Strategy? 
 
A. The “Incorporation Mobility” Cases 
 
       Corporate mobility is a prerequisite for regulatory competition among member states and, according to a body of 
corporate law scholarship in the United States, can significantly affect the level of *367 experimentation and the quality 
of institutional arrangements. [FN51] In the United States, corporate mobility is seen as a unique phenomenon--any cor-
poration can select its jurisdiction of incorporation at any point in its life cycle so long as its managers and shareholders 
agree on the choice. In Europe, corporate mobility is a more complicated notion that makes a fundamental distinction 
between reincorporation of existing firms and incorporation of start-up firms. EU legislation had opened only a narrow 
door for reincorporation of existing firms. For start-ups, in contrast, things have changed radically. The Centros line of 
decisions make it possible for an entrepreneur in member state A to incorporate a start-up company in member state B 
and later to establish a branch containing all of the assets and activities of the business in state A, even if that state sub-
scribes to the classical seat theory. Even if the establishment in state B serves the purpose of avoiding state A's rigid 
corporate law rules, such as minimum capital requirements, the corporation normally obtains full recognition in state A 
without following any of state A's corporate law requirements. 
 
       The Centros-case is itself an example of this scenario. Centros involved Danish nationals who, seeking to evade 
Danish minimum capital requirements, organized a close corporation in the United Kingdom. Then, seeking to establish 
the actual business in Denmark, the organizers sought Denmark's permission to register a branch. Permission was refu-
sed, and the ECJ decided that this refusal was contrary to the freedom of establishment under Articles 43 and 48 of the 
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EC Treaty. Denmark, like the United Kingdom, follows the theory of incorporation. The firm's primary establishment--its 
legal status as a corporation--was accordingly not in question. The case solely concerned the “secondary establishment” 
of a branch by an English private company in Denmark. Secondary establishment refers to the setting up of agencies, 
branches or subsidiaries. The ECJ expanded the scope of the term “branch,” reducing the difference between primary and 
secondary establishment to a minimum and ruling that under the Treaty, Denmark could not refuse to register a branch of 
a firm organized as a private limited company in the United Kingdom even if the sole purpose was to evade the applicati-
on of Denmark's minimum capital requirements. [FN52] To be sure, this new permissiveness has its limits. Under the 
Cassis de Dijon decision, [FN53] the Court does allow the Treaty's freedoms to be restricted when justified*368 by the 
public interest. Yet, the ECJ rejected the Danish justification for minimum capital. Creditors of closely held firms, said 
the Court, could look to means of protection other than minimum capital requirements, and governments seeking to pro-
tect creditors could adopt measures less burdensome to fundamental freedoms. [FN54] 
 
       Centros did not involve a country of origin following the real seat doctrine, and thus did not explicitly rule the real 
seat doctrine contrary to Community law. Still, the judgment has important implications for corporate migration. The 
English private company in this case had been incorporated by Danes who never intended to conduct operations in the 
United Kingdom. Read broadly, the case shows that entrepreneurs can incorporate in countries offering internal processes 
and legal regimes that lower their costs regardless of where the firms' assets, employees, and investors are located. 
[FN55] But the case also points to possible limits to the privileges extended, leaving open the exact parameters of mutual 
recognition. If in a future case a member state imposes higher minimum standards as a condition for recognition, said the 
ECJ in Centros, such measures must be proportional and non-discriminatory. [FN56] It remains to be seen which mini-
mum standards will prove proportional and non-discriminatory, in particular with regards to minimum standards protec-
ting stakeholders other than creditors. 
 
       The ECJ continued along the Centros path in Überseering, opening the door to a transfer of the real seat. The case 
holds that when a firm incorporated in member state B, in which it has its initial registered office, is deemed to have 
moved its actual center of administration to state A, Articles 43 and 48 of the EC Treaty preclude state A from applying 
its law so as to deny the firm's capacity to bring legal proceedings before its national courts. [FN57] As in Centros, re-
fusal*369 to recognize a firm's corporate status was held to be a disproportionate sanction for the mere transfer of the real 
seat. Strictly speaking, the Überseering-judgment does not address the incorporation process by a newly established firm 
in a member state different from its actual place of business. However, since the existing corporation did not move its 
statutory seat--and thus kept its corporate nationality--this case is considered to be a further clarification of Centros and 
not a different aspect of corporate mobility. 
 
       Both Centros and Überseering left open questions regarding the scope of a member state's prerogative to apply nati-
onal law to pseudo-foreign companies. Inspire Art answered some of these questions, extending the rule beyond the issue 
of recognition and addressing the application of a member state's broader system of corporate law. Inspire Art involved a 
Dutch enterprise organized in the United Kingdom solely for the purpose of avoiding Dutch company law's stringent 
rules. The organizers registered a branch in the Handelregister of the Chamber of Commerce in Amsterdam, but refused 
to register as a pseudo-foreign company. The ECJ then addressed the question whether Articles 43 and 48 of the EC 
Treaty preclude the Netherlands from imposing additional demands such as those found in the Wet op de formeel buiten-
landse vennootschappen (WFBV-Dutch law on pseudo-foreign companies). 
 
       The ECJ held that Article 1 of the WFBV, which required Inspire Art to register as a pseudo-foreign company, was 
contrary to Article 2 of the Eleventh Council Directive, which does not allow member states to impose disclosure requi-
rements above those provided by the Directive. The Court also ruled that it was part of the freedom of establishment if a 
company, established in one member state, carries out its operations in another member state. Moreover, the ECJ held 
that the minimum capital requirements for pseudo-foreign companies mandated by the WFBV were in violation of the 
freedom of establishment and not justified by the exception of Article 46 or any other requirement in the general interest. 
 
       Summing up, Centros introduced mandatory mutual recognition and review of minimum standards. It implied, con-
trary to the real seat doctrine, that incorporation in one member state cannot be called into question in another simply 
because the firm's central administration is not located in its state of incorporation. Überseering applies that reasoning to 
a transfer of real seat. Inspire Art extends the ruling from mandated access to judicial process to substantive corporate 
law. 
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*370 B. The Reincorporation Mobility Cases 
 
       The Centros triad does not cover reincorporation. Laws applying to reincorporation continue to retard the mobility of 
established European companies, as illustrated by the following scenario: Company X, incorporated in member state A 
wishes to reincorporate in member state B. To this end, company X plans to organize a front company X1 in state B and 
then merge company X into the front company. Company X will retain its administrative headquarters in State A and 
remain resident there for tax purposes. The company laws of neither state A nor state B include provisions that facilitate a 
merger of a company formed under one regime with a company formed under the laws of another state. 
 
       The lack of corporate law provisions facilitating company X's planned transaction was the rule rather than exception 
in the EU. Mergers of this kind were only possible in a small number of member states, specifically Greece, Italy, Portu-
gal, and Luxembourg. National policymakers, content to follow old patterns, have opened few doors to facilitate these 
cross-border combinations. Absent statutory recognition of the merger, company X literally must incur the cost to trans-
fer its assets and liabilities to a new entity in state B, liquidating itself in state A prior to the transfer. 
 
       A robust freedom of establishment could arguably remedy this situation. The ECJ took a step in this direction in its 
decision involving the merger between Security Vision Concept SA and Sevic Systems AG. The case concerned a sale of 
all assets by a Luxembourg firm to a German firm in exchange for the German corporation's common stock. The parties 
structured the transaction so that the Luxembourg transferor was liquidated after the asset transfer. German corporate law 
recognized such mergers “by dissolution without liquidation” only among domestic firms, and the German register of 
companies refused the registration of the merger. The ECJ held that the refusal violated Articles 43 and 48 of the EC 
Treaty, citing cost savings and brushing aside concerns of fiscal supervision and protection of creditors and minority 
shareholders. [FN58] 
 
       Note that the merger in Sevic Systems did not touch upon the law of the transferor state, Luxembourg. The scenario 
described previously therefore is not covered in all particulars: company X still needs the right to exit state A's corporate 
law regime in addition to the recognition of the merger in state B while keeping its headquarters in state A. Also, Sevic 
only covers a merger that results in both the transfer of the statutory seat and the real seat. Exit from state A becomes 
complete only if state A recognizes the state B incorporation *371 of an entity with a local administrative seat. State A's 
real seat doctrine could thus remain a barrier. 
 
       Furthermore, even if both states A and B enacted facilitating corporate law, other reincorporation costs could render 
company X immobile. Reorganizing under a foreign corporate law statute often triggers taxes on hidden reserves, effec-
tively restricting the demand for different national governance systems. If this exit tax burden exceeds the expected cost 
savings held out by the alternative legal regime, migration is pointless even if there is a complete and consistent set of 
harmonization Directives in place. 
 
       The ECJ in Lasteyrie du Saillant [FN59] addressed the permissibility of exit taxes in the context of the transfer of 
residence by an individual, self-employed person, prohibiting discriminatory taxation of the exiting taxpayer. Mr. de 
Lasteyrie left France in 1998 to settle in Belgium, transferring both his professional practice and tax residence. At that 
time, he held securities that exceeded twenty-five percent of the profits of a company subject to corporation tax in Fran-
ce--securities whose market value exceeded their acquisition price. The Code Général des Impôts includes a provision 
that prescribes a levy of income taxes on such value differences if a French resident leaves the country. The plaintiff 
challenged this provision and the case was referred to the ECJ, which held that the legislation in question was incompati-
ble with the exercise of free establishment. The Court reasoned that the rule was discriminatory because taxpayers who 
transfer their residence abroad are taxed on latent increases in value, while taxpayers remaining in France are taxed on 
increase in value only after they have actually realized such gains. Thus, Lasteyrie du Saillant provides that exit taxes 
cannot hinder the free establishment exercised by a natural person and that exit tax regimes must comply with the criteria 
established in Centros. [FN60] 
 
       Lasteyrie du Saillant is important because it challenges the discretion of member states to use exit taxes interfering 
with the freedom of establishment. It follows that current exit charge rules applied to companies in a number of member 
states could be vulnerable to ECJ challenge. But the matter is not free from doubt, because the opinion distinguished 
between natural persons and corporate residents*372 and therefore left untouched the ECJ's earlier judgment in Daily 
Mail. 
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       Daily Mail concerned a British company that wished to transfer its administrative seat to the Netherlands for the 
purpose of tax avoidance. The company planned to dispose of a large capital asset and to transfer its central office to the 
Netherlands in order to effect a transfer of its tax residence. Dutch tax residence in turn meant a stepped up tax basis on 
assets, averting a substantial United Kingdom capital gains tax on the planned asset sale. Meanwhile, no transfer of the 
firm's domicile of incorporation was contemplated. Since both the Netherlands and the United Kingdom follow the in-
corporation doctrine, transferring the administrative seat raised no questions concerning the governing company law. But 
United Kingdom tax law [FN61] required the Treasury's consent to the transfer of the company's seat and tax residence 
abroad. Daily Mail argued that the UK consent provision was contrary to Articles 43 and 48 of the Treaty. 
 
       The ECJ treated the claim as a company law matter, holding that Art 43 of the Treaty does not grant a company the 
right to transfer the administrative seat while retaining corporate status under the law of the jurisdiction of origin unless 
that jurisdiction's law allows for the transfer. The Court underscored, however, that “the rights guaranteed by [the Treaty] 
would be rendered meaningless if the Member State of origin could prohibit undertakings from leaving in order to esta-
blish themselves in another Member State.” [FN62] The key point on the facts of the case, stressed the Court, was that 
the UK exit regulation applied in cases where the company wished to transfer its seat while maintaining UK company 
status. In such cases, the national legislation may freely impose conditions, such as obtaining consent of the Treasury. 
 
       Daily Mail coexists in tension with the Centros cases, creating a distinction between freedom of movement concer-
ning immigration, as to which member states cannot impose any additional requirements, and emigration, as to which the 
national legislator under the laws of incorporation retains some discretion. Daily Mail's incidental acceptance of an exit 
tax barrier also stands in tension with the exit tax prohibition in Lasteyrie du Saillant. Many expected the ECJ to resolve 
the tension in favor of Centros and Lasteyrie du Saillant in the recent Cartesio case. [FN63] Instead, the Court took the 
occasion to reconfirm Daily Mail. 
 
        *373 Cartesio [FN64] involved a preliminary ruling made by the Court of Appeal of Szeged (Hungary) in procee-
dings with respect to the application of Cartesio Oktató és Szolgáltató bt (“Cartesio”), a limited partnership formed under 
Hungarian law, to amend the commercial register to record the transfer of its seat to Italy. Cartesio wished to remain 
registered in Hungary, but the Hungarian court rejected its request. It held Cartesio to Hungarian corporate law procedu-
res requiring the company first to be dissolved and liquidated and then incorporated in Italy, with the new Italian compa-
ny then registering as a branch in Hungary. 
 
       Before the ECJ, the Advocate General opined that such a blunderbuss application of the real seat concept violates 
freedom of establishment. [FN65] But the ECJ went on to hold that under Articles 43 and 48 of the Treaty, freedom of 
establishment is not violated when a member state restricts the transfer of an incorporated company's seat to another 
member state if the company retains its status under law of the member state of incorporation. [FN66] Following Daily 
Mail, the ECJ reasoned that the applicable national law defines the companies which are capable of enjoying the right of 
establishment, including any factor connecting the incorporated company to the territory of the member state. When a 
company breaks the connecting factor, the national law of the member state is no longer applicable and the company will 
no longer enjoy the right of establishment, particularly if the company reorganizes itself in another member state. 
 
       Daily Mail and Cartesio together establish a residual zone of vitality for the real seat doctrine, threatening to deter 
existing firms in real seat states from moving their businesses elsewhere. The zone clearly covers the case where a firm 
attempts to remove its seat to another member state but seeks to maintain its incorporated status and encounters barriers 
from tax as well as company law. The zone's boundaries are otherwise unclear, making it difficult to assess whether the 
ECJ will extend its freedom of establishment jurisprudence to legislation presently hindering corporate emigration, such 
as seat transfers and mergers. At the same time, even assuming the extension of the rule of Lasteyrie du Saillant to corpo-
rate entities, there will be cases where mobility will continue to imply adverse tax consequences. 
 
*374 C. The Practical Impact of the ECJ Case Law 
 
       The ECJ decisions in Centros, Überseering and Inspire Art make it possible for new firms to migrate to more favora-
ble jurisdictions. Arbitrage with respect to minimum capital rules is already under way. Europe's minimum capital requi-
rements often exceed 8,000. These capital maintenance mandates constrain the repurchase of issued shares, the reducti-
on of capital, and the issuance of new shares. They also have the effect of limiting access of wealth-constrained entrepre-
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neurs to the corporate model, and at the margin reduce the number of potential start-up businesses. As a consequence, the 
demand for low-cost company law vehicles unhindered by capital maintenance requirements is relatively high across the 
EU. Given mobility, one would expect that jurisdictions without minimum capital requirements would attract more start-
up registrations. This hypothesis is corroborated by the German Government's official database. Table 2 shows that short-
ly after the ECJ decisions more than ten percent of the newly incorporated companies in Germany were limiteds. This 
made Germany the absolute leader in post-Centros emigrations while the United Kingdom, with its private limited com-
pany form, is the overwhelmingly favorite host jurisdiction. 
 
Table 2: Ratio of New Incorporations GmbH - Limited (Private Company UK) 
 
        01/2005 
  
 
      02/2005 
  
 
      03/2005 
  
 
      04/2005 
  
 
      05/2005 
  
 
      06/2005 
  
 
      07/2005 
  
 
      08/2005 
   
 
      GmbH  
  
 
      3115 
  
 
      3113 
  
 
      3216 
  
 
      3018 
  
 
      2675 
  
 
      3056 
  
 
      2637 
  
 
      2666 
   
 
      Limited  
  
 
      357 
  
 
      359 
  
 
      403 
  
 
      429 
  
 
      399 
  
 
      426 
  
 
      381 
  
 
      441 
   
 
 
       Source: Deutscher Bundestag (BT) - Drucksache 16/283- 16.12.2005- Auswirkungen und Probleme der Priva-
te Limited Companies in Deutschland. 
       The Netherlands runs a distant second in terms of new incorporations of UK private limited companies with their 
activities in the Netherlands. Figure 3 shows the increasing popularity of the UK private limited company model in the 
Netherlands. This analysis is based on the January 1997 through June 2007 Chamber of Commerce Registry, which sur-
veys all of the private limited companies that were established in the Netherlands in a particular year and that are still 
registered in July 2007. It distinguishes between the annual total of “Dutch” UK private limited company incorporations 
and the number of such firms still economically active as of July 1, 2007. The numbers show that many of these firms 
expire quickly if they ever do any business at all. [FN67] 
 
Figure 3: Registered Private Limited Companies in the Netherlands established in 1997-2007 and still registered in July 
2007 
 
TABULAR OR GRAPHIC MATERIAL SET FORTH AT THIS POINT IS NOT DISPLAYABLE 
        Source: Data from the Dutch Chamber of Commerce. The total number of private limited companies is extra-
polated from the registration between January 1, 2007- June 30, 2007; Marco Becht, Colin Mayer & Hannes F. 
Wagner, Where Do Firms Incorporate? Deregulation and the Cost of Entry, 14 J. Corp. Fin. 241 (2008). 
        *375 Post-Centros data for the period 2003-2006 collected by Becht, Mayer and Wagner corroborate the finding, 
showing that the rate of dissolution of these “Dutch” Limiteds is relatively high. Of the more than 6,000 “Dutch” private 
limited companies registered in that period, only approximately 2,000 were still registered at the Chamber of Commerce 
on July 1, 2007. [FN68] (The data also include branches of UK companies, but most of these companies have either 
Dutch names or a majority of directors who reside in the Netherlands, making them “Dutch” private limited companies.) 
 
       This set of Dutch migrants looks more robust if the focus is on the data for 2006 and the first half of 2007. These 
data show that more than 60% of the “Dutch” private limited companies remain active. [FN69] “Active” does not neces-
sarily mean large; quite to the contrary, the economically active private limited companies are actually very small. 
Amongst these economically active companies, the most popular*376 sectors are wholesalers (20%), service providers 
(19%), retail companies (10%), construction and transport firms (10%), and IT and software businesses (9%). 
 
       Why do many of these firms have such short active lives? The low survival rate follows from the characteristics 
common to the start-ups that find foreign incorporation attractive. European firms incorporating in the United Kingdom 
are mostly “round-trippers” [FN70] looking for rock bottom cost and speed. Empirical evidence indicates that lower costs 
are the main factor inducing small companies to incorporate in the United Kingdom. Economic research shows that in the 
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pre-Centros era, forming a private company was rather expensive, as a percentage of per capita GNI, and required many 
long and complex formalities in most member states. [FN71] In the United Kingdom, by contrast, costs are minimized 
and results occur quickly: a company can be established in a few days rather than waiting for weeks elsewhere. These 
advantages are brought to the attention of entrepreneurs on the Continent by commercial registration agents who adverti-
se and vigorously promote the United Kingdom as a desirable destination for small companies. The agents commonly 
offer to create a company within twenty-four hours for an insignificant sum. Given such terms, incorporation need not 
necessarily presuppose an actual business. It is thus not surprising that the survival rate of “foreign” private limited com-
panies is extraordinarily low. [FN72] 
 
       Meanwhile, the terms of foreign incorporation have not turned out to be quite as easy as some of these entrepreneurs 
believed. Practice reveals that foreign corporate law regimes contain significant disadvantages for some small businesses. 
A German entrepreneur using a UK private limited company may face more costs than initially expected due to the Uni-
ted Kingdom's different business climate: [FN73] loss of personal privacy, loss of competitive position, direct complian-
ce charges, and administrative costs. Surprisingly, smaller German firms registered in the United Kingdom tended to 
default on their disclosure obligations under the Fourth and Seventh EU Directives on annual accounts and consolidated 
accounts of limited liability entities. Perhaps these small firms prefer to pay a fine rather *377 than to reveal information 
that competitors could use against them. [FN74] Alternatively, the first wave of directors of “German” private limited 
companies may not have been adequately informed of their personal responsibility for the filing of annual returns and 
accounts under UK criminal law or may not have taken seriously the risk of having criminal charges brought against 
them. In the United Kingdom, in contrast, small businesses tend to file their financial disclosures in a timely and accurate 
manner. 
 
       Registration agents predict that German companies will adapt to the UK compliance practice, and research conduc-
ted by Companies House shows that the compliance rates have improved significantly. [FN75] This is unsurprising in 
view of the fact that in 2007 the standard UK prosecution warning letter was translated into German and forwarded to 
home addresses of directors of “German” private limited companies. There is little doubt that this initiative has prompted 
better compliance. Note that this sequence of events implies competitive motives in the United Kingdom, so if agents in 
the United Kingdom wanted a high volume of continental incorporations, it was especially important that Companies 
House avoided the prosecution of non-UK resident directors during the immediate post-Centros period. 
 
Figure 4: Trends in the Number of Appointments of German and Dutch Directors in UK Private Limited Companies 
(January 2003=100) 
 
TABULAR OR GRAPHIC MATERIAL SET FORTH AT THIS POINT IS NOT DISPLAYABLE 
        Source: The Dutch trend is adapted from information available at Companies House (UK). The German trend 
is adapted from Wilhelm Niemeier, Die “Mini GmbH” (UG) trotz Marktwende bei der Limited?, 28 Zeitschrift for 
Wirtschaftsrecht (ZIP) 1794 (2007). 
       These compliance problems may be contributing to an activity reduction. Figure 4 tracks numbers of German and 
Dutch directors appointed to UK private limited company boards since January 2003. The figure shows the number of 
directors appointed who are German or Dutch nationals (including the number of such directors in a UK branch or com-
pany that have a majority of British nationals as directors). Since we could rightly assume that the number of real UK 
private limited companies is relatively constant, it is obvious that the noticeable differences shown in Figure 4 are due to 
the changes in the respective total numbers of “German” and “Dutch” private limited companies that were set up in order 
to circumvent cumbersome domestic requirements. The chart overall shows an upward trend, particularly at the outset of 
the post-Centros period, a trend that probably reflects pent-up demand for a low cost vehicle. But beginning in fall 2006, 
the trend shifts, with numbers of new appointments declining. The leveling trend in the number of German and Dutch 
directors since 2006 could be the result of multiple causes, compliance problems among them. A question arises as to 
whether responsive lawmaking at home also figures into the mix. 
 
        *378 It appears that lawmakers who view small company migration to the UK private limited company as a problem 
calling for a solution have a ready expedient. All they need do is replicate the UK template and the UK vehicle's competi-
tive cost advantage is undermined. Table 3 collects some facts about the company law regimes of the member states that 
have experienced significant numbers of UK limited incorporations. If incorporation mobility occurs in large volume 
only if migration to the host state promises economic gain for the businesses in question and their agents, then the moti-
vating economic gains in this case are transaction cost savings and speed. Minimum capital requirements, high incorpora-
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tion costs, and cumbersome formation requirements lead to a significant increase of the use of the UK limited in the post-
Centros period. For instance, while the limited has always been a relatively popular business form in Germany, the num-
ber of UK limited companies increased significantly during the post-Centros period (from approximately 2,000 to *379 
more than 40,000). Given this correlation between formation requirements and the use of the UK business form, home 
lawmakers could arguably reduce its popularity by eliminating its durational and cost advantages. It should come as no 
surprise that this is already beginning to happen. 
 
Table 3: The Correlation Between the Increased use of the Limited and Formation Requirements 
 
       Country 
   
 
      Pre-Centros 
(1997-1999) 
   
 
      Post-Centros 
(2003-2006) 
   
 
      Relative 
increase (post-
Centros divided 
by pre-Centros)  
  
 
      Minimum 
capital (required 
paid-in capital) 
   
 
      Costs () 
   
 
      Duration 
(days) 
   
 
      Germany  
  
 
      2,009  
  
 
      43,181  
  
 
      21.5  
  
 




      1,000  
  
 
      24 
   
 
      Austria  
  
 
       240  
  
 
       3,141  
  
 
      13.1  
  
 




      2,000  
  
 
      30 
   
 
      Denmark  
  
 
       446  
  
 
       2,291  
  
 
      5.1  
  
 




      6,175 (- 
August 2003)  
  
 
      23 (- August 
2003) 
   
 
      Netherlands  
  
 
      1,590  
  
 
       6,652  
  
 
      4.1  
  
 




      2,000  
  
 
      10 
   
 
      Belgium  
  
 
       914  
  
 
       1,841  
  
 
      2.0  
  
 




      1,500  
  
 
      30 
   
 
 
       Source: Adapted from Wilhelm Niemeier, GmbH und Limited im Markt der Unternehmensrechtsträger, 27 
Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht 2237 (2006); Marco Becht, Colin Mayer & Hannes F. Wagner, Where Do Firms 
Incorporate? Deregulation and the Cost of Entry, 14 J. Corp. Fin. 241 (2008); www.doingbusiness.org. 
       Consider the case of Denmark, where lawmakers modified their private company law to fast track (from two to three 
weeks to two to three hours) their formation procedures but without altering in effect the minimum capital requirements. 
As a result, there was a sixty-five percent drop in the use of the UK limited in Denmark, that is of the 2,291 Post-Centros 
“Danish” private limited companies only 807 were established in 2004 to 2006. 
 
       Other countries have made different adjustments. For instance, France lowered its minimum capital requirement to 
1 in 2003. In Germany, the proposal is to reduce the minimum capital. [FN76] In the Netherlands, despite the relatively 
low number of firms attracted to the UK legal regime (see Table 3) a new legislative measure [FN77] would *380 make 
it easier and less costly to establish a Dutch private company, the BV, by abolishing the 18,000 minimum capital requi-
rement and by simplifying the formation procedures as well as the drafting of the articles of association. Although the 
Dutch simplification proposals entail both theoretical and practical problems, the legislation could reduce company flight 
to pre-Centros levels. 
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D. Responsive (but Not Competitive) Lawmaking in Germany and the Netherlands 
 
       The previous discussion highlights a crucial point concerning incorporation mobility in the EU. For the most part, 
only the smallest start-up firms consider adoption of a British limited--those which are more responsive to features of 
corporation law that lower out of pocket costs rather than those responsive to the features of corporation law that deal 
with internal governance structures. This results in a clear incentive for lawmakers to reduce or eliminate minimum capi-
tal requirements and to provide simpler formation rules, but not much more. 
 
       Thus, incorporation mobility resulting from the ECJ case law is a less significant stimulus for competitive lawma-
king than proponents had predicted. If we view “choice-of-business-form” decisions in the aggregate, out of pocket costs 
of incorporation emerge as only one of a number of determining factors. This dilutes post-Centros competitive incentives 
for national legislatures. [FN78] 
 
       We accordingly expect member state policymakers to remain within their existing incentive framework. Under the 
prevailing pattern of corporate lawmaking, legislators occasionally upgrade an existing corporate form but refrain from 
undertaking fundamental reforms. Such upgrades seek to facilitate the easy use of corporate vehicles, but only within a 
narrow margin. The legislatures are unlikely to touch the core components of the legal tradition and its legitimating featu-
res. They tend to leave familiar, “tried and tested” provisions in place, and rarely introduce more than a few necessary 
changes. This makes it easy for lawyers and existing firms to adjust to the changes and protects their investments in esta-
blished practices. As a result, such statutory upgrades rarely entail much technical or political difficulty for lawmakers. 
Fundamental changes to core systemic elements that would introduce innovations enabling *381 firms to adopt more 
effective governance structures imply political complications, and are therefore avoided. [FN79] 
 
       Some recent corporate law reform initiatives have proven costly and time-consuming for their legislative proponents. 
This is evidenced by: (1) the difficulty to design acceptable improvements, and (2) the reluctance of lawmakers to agree 
and quickly implement the proposed changes. It seems that economic and political pressures have not built up sufficient-
ly to force more aggressive legislative action. If high stakes competition were the underlying motivation, enactment 
would be smoother and quicker. [FN80] 
 
       In Germany, for example, the current upgrade process began with a proposal to change the law on the limited liabili-
ty company (Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung, GmbH) in particular to (1) reduce the minimum capital requirement 
from 25,000 to 1, (2) transplant the British wrongful trading rule, [FN81] and (3) give firms the option to choose a 
single layer member-managed GmbH. The German legislature had a two-phase reform in mind. First, a compromise 
proposal would have lowered the capital requirement from 25,000 to 10,000; subsequently, a more fundamental reform 
would have included further adjustments. However, due to the change in government after elections in September 2005, 
the proposed reform has not seen the light of day. Major reforms that involve deviations from the current rules on the 
preservation of share capital and the notarial deed requirement for the transfer of the shares are unlikely to find support in 
the near future. Reform groups seeking a more flexible and lower cost GmbH structure failed to overcome the system's 
barriers and to end legislative stasis, presumably because they failed to alter society's perception of the need for change. 
 
       But the increasing popularity of the UK limited does continue to focus German attention on corporate law reform. A 
competition-driven law reform impulse does persist: a new proposal to introduce a modernized GmbH was published in 
May 2006. The proposed act--Gesetz zur Modernisierung des GmbH-Rechts und zur Bekämpfung von Missbräuchen 
(MoMiG)--reflects the three main functions of the GmbH law: [FN82] (1) The incorporation of a GmbH should be fast, 
cheap, and simple; (2) the new GmbH should offer a transparent shareholder*382 structure; and (3) creditors should be 
better protected against illicit exploitation and rent seeking strategies of the owners. The reform measures simplify the 
registration system, permitting a fast and electronic registration with the Chamber of Commerce. The availability of a 
public shareholders' list at the Chamber of Commerce emphasizes the importance of electronic registration. It is the in-
tention of the new Act to consider only registered persons as shareholders; an up-to-date electronic list should help pre-
vent the acquisition of the company by unregistered shareholders. In order to make the GmbH an attractive product, the 
new Act also proposes to abolish the requirement that the firm's registered office be located in the same country as its 
corporate seat. Surprisingly, however, the upgraded GmbH would still require a minimum capital of 10,000. Finally, as 
a trade-off for the reduced minimum capital requirement, the Government proposes to increase the managing director's 
liability in the event of the firm's insolvency. Thus Germany's legislature seeks to preserve the popularity of the GmbH as 
the entity of choice through compromise. 
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       In May 2007, the German Government submitted a revised version of the MoMiG Act to Parliament. It provides 
smaller firms with the possibility of incorporating as a variant of the GmbH without minimum capital, but with the legal 
requirement to save profits until a minimum level of capital has been reached (the Unternehmergesellschaft). The original 
proposal allowed the founders of small firms with a maximum of three shareholders, who make use of the statute's model 
articles of association (Mustergesellschaftsvertrag), simply to sign the model articles--which will be attached to the cor-
porate statute. This procedure would streamline and expedite the incorporation process by eliminating the notarial deed. 
[FN83] Despite the fact that “traditionally thinking” lawyers have prevented the abolishment of the notarial deed, [FN84] 
these measures would certainly have an effect on the German use of the UK limited company similar to the effect of the 
fast track registration system in Denmark. But they would not bestow “Delaware Status” upon Germany (or upon Den-
mark). 
 
       The Netherlands is considering a private company law (Besloten Vennootschap, BV) reform that provides measures 
to resolve complex issues in closely held business relationships. The issues range from problems of collective action to 
free-riding, shirking, private information, and opportunism. The legislation makes the BV more accessible *383 and 
flexible, with the goal to encourage entrepreneurship and innovation. In particular, the Dutch proposal seeks to minimize 
the three specific agency problems inherent in the governance structure of non-listed companies. 
 
       The first agency problem involves conflicts between the company and third parties such as creditors and employees. 
The proposal eliminates the minimum capital requirement and capital maintenance rules and replaces them with an ex-
panded directors' liability for unlawful payment of dividends or unlawful stock purchase or redemption. Under the new 
regime, board members may be jointly and severally liable towards the company if a proposed dividend or stock purcha-
se or redemption does not meet the liquidation test--which means that directors must check and verify that the company 
will still be able to pay its debts at the time of the dividend payment or stock redemption. Shareholders can only be called 
upon to return any payments received if they acted in bad faith and the company faced bankruptcy within one year after 
the unlawful payment of dividend or unlawful stock redemption. 
 
       The second agency problem is shareholder-director conflict. The “new” BV attempts to mitigate vulnerability to 
conflict by allowing parties freely to contract about their own decision-making arrangements. The Dutch bill explicitly 
states that a general meeting of shareholders may give instructions to the board of directors regarding the general course 
of the financial, social, and economic policies. In order to give full effect to the parties' intentions, companies may fur-
thermore issue shares without voting powers or dividend rights attached to them. These shares may be categorized in 
different and separate classes, with, if the articles of association so permit, each class being entitled to appoint and remo-
ve at least one director. 
 
       This “contractual” flexibility also offers a solution to a third agency problem, the one arising between the controlling 
and minority shareholders. Minority shareholders with the power to appoint their own directors have better protection 
from opportunistic behavior and expropriation on the part of the controlling shareholders. This would not obviate the 
need for ex post enforcement to protect minority investors in non-listed companies. In a non-listed company that is cha-
racterized by a relatively small number of shareholders, no ready market for the corporate stock, and with substantial 
majority shareholder participation in management, direction, and operation of the firm, minority shareholders still could 
be locked into a very unpleasant situation and left basically unprotected and vulnerable. The Dutch Civil Code already 
provides for an exit/buy-out remedy that shareholders can use as a last resort if other, softer mechanisms prove to be 
insufficient. Any shareholder may require the other shareholders to acquire his or her shares if his or her rights are *384 
prejudiced by the conduct of these shareholders. Unfortunately, this statutory exit right is a costly and time-consuming 
legal procedure involving complicated valuation issues. The proposal would streamline the buy-out and valuation proce-
dure and permit temporary injunctions. 
 
       While the Dutch BV proposal seeks to promote efficiency and simplification of corporate law, it is questionable 
whether the changes are fundamental enough to attract foreign companies or to prevent domestic firms from migrating to 
other jurisdictions. The BV, even as amended, will not be as user-friendly as alternative regimes. The relationship bet-
ween the shareholders and the board of directors will be governed mainly by the articles of association under Dutch cor-
porate law. The Dutch Civil Code expressly requires that firms disclose essential information in the articles, such as the 
capital structure, the company's objectives and any deviations from the statutory default rules.   [FN85] In addition, the 
incorporation formalities will continue to suffer from a variety of technicalities, including a notarial deed drawn up by a 
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lawyer who specializes in incorporations. Moreover, the deed of incorporation, which contains the comprehensive set of 
articles of association, must be filed and made public with the Dutch commercial registry. The Dutch proponents side-
stepped the issue of relaxing the mandates tied into the notarial deed, which would have improved the chances for increa-




       This Article has addressed European legislative responses to increased corporate mobility arising from the imple-
mentation of the SE and from European Court of Justice decisions, which allow start-up firms to set up business in other 
member states. 
 
       The SE has not triggered significant corporate movement and has thus not prompted any national level regulatory 
adjustments. Switching to the SE is expensive and its future benefits are uncertain. There is a limited number of cases in 
which the SE helps firms to overcome inefficiencies inherent in rigid national regimes. Some companies in jurisdictions 
such as Germany, with extensive employee participation rights, find it worth the cost to convert to a SE. But aside from 
such express benefits, the SE will not set more competitive lawmaking in motion. Its rules are simply not designed for 
the needs of a wide range of companies and while it opens a door to *385 migration by moving the administrative seat, it 
does not offer the freedom to choose a corporate law based on mere nominal contacts. 
 
       ECJ case law, on the other hand, has triggered legislative movement to transform the private company model into a 
more flexible, all purpose vehicle. Company law's rigid formalities and capital maintenance rules thwarted the emergence 
of more flexible legislation, but the increased desire for mobility has removed some of the obstacles and opened up op-
portunities for reform-minded lawmakers. The scope of these reforms remains narrow because the competitive pressure 
is largely limited to economically-negligible small entre- preneurs, who mostly aim to minimize the out of pocket costs 
of incorporation. 
 
       Mobility is still largely constrained by member state regulation. Even though the ECJ has reduced the reach of the 
real seat doctrine and its barriers to freedom of movement, the Court has not effectively eliminated it. ECJ case law, for 
instance, does not explicitly resolve issues involving a domestic company wishing to exit its state of incorporation. Se-
rious obstacles still prevent a burst of mobility. They include the absence of a reincorporation procedure and the levy of 
exit taxes that restrict cross-border mobility. 
 
       The ECJ may yet remove these remaining obstacles to cross-border mobility as it continues its line of decisions in 
the future. ECJ interventionism certainly would make domestic lawmakers more responsive. They have already reacted 
to the loss of small start-ups and they certainly would adjust their regulatory and fiscal strategies to keep large, existing 
domestic firms at home. Whether a European Delaware is on the horizon is a more difficult question fraught with specu-
lation. All one can say is that the present situation under the EC Treaty does not entail incentives similar to those that 
drive U.S. charter competition. 
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